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10 Introduction
In Long and Katayama (2002) they presented a model of exploitation of a
common property resource, when agents can also invest in private and productive
capital. The resource extracted from a common pool is non-renewable in the model.
We try to extend their result to the case where a common pool is under uncertainty
in the sense that it could have a sudden increase or decrease in the process of
extraction.
The extension is quite natural when we see the present state of international
crude oil market. Some producing countries encountered the technological diﬃculties
of extraction and/or social hazards. Also the past history showed the unexpected
discovery of new oil reserves. Yet the total reserve in the earth planet is limited, and
it is expected that the resource is ﬁnally exhausted. However, people can accumulate
man-made capital for substituting the exhaustible resource and extend the period
in which the resource is utilized before it is completely depleted.
Considering these intrinsic aspects of resource economy, we present a model of
uncertainty in the process of extraction of the resource and build the capital to
substitute for the exhaustible resource. To incorporate it we build a model with a
random jump in the stock of the resource.
The main issue is to see whether there is an optimal solution to this model.
1 The Model
There are n identical agents having common access to a stock of nonrenewable
natural resource, denoted by S(t). Each agent i also owns a private capital stock
Ki(t). Agent i extracts the amount Ri(t) of the common resource stock (i=1,...,n).




and the reserve depletes according to
˙ S(t) = ¡R(t)
if it is not subject to any uncertainty.
First assume that each individual extracts equal amount, and so it follows that
˙ S = ¡nRi:
However, the reserve may be augmented or damaged several times in the ﬁnite
horizon and the reserve size is aﬀected by those jumps in magnitude.
Let us given a probability space (Ω;F;P;F = fFtg) satisfying the usual condi-
tions and the jump process is given on this basis. The jump process takes the form
dJ(t), and the resource stock is governed by the following stochastic diﬀerential
equation (in short, SDE)
dS(t) = dJ(t) ¡ nRidt:
The stok level at time t is
















A 2 B(R+ £ R), a Borel set and ¸ > 0. ¸¾(z)dz is called L´ evy measure and we
assume that Z 1
¡1
jzj
2 ^ 1 ¾(z)dz < 1:
The L´ evy measure expresses the possible jump size and ¸ is the average number of
jumps to occur during unit time interval.
Assume that the extracted resource cannot be directly consumed. Instead, agent
i uses Ri as an input, which, in combination with his labor input and his privately
owned capital stock Ki yields an output Yi of ﬁnal good. For simplicity we choose a







where 0 < ®;¯ < 1. Agent i consumes Ci(t), and the remaining quantity is invested
to accumulate his physical capital. The rate of accumulation of the privately owned
capital stock is thus





Each individual utility is increasing in consumption Ci(t):














subject to (1.1) and (1.3), and the initial conditions
S(0) = S0;
Ki(0) = Ki0:
° is the elasticity of marginal utility, and for mathematical simplicity as in Long
and Katayama ([6]) assume that ° = ®.
32 The cooperative outcome
If the agents cooperate each other, they will collectively seek to maximize the
same level of their welfare. They will choose the rate of extraction per agent Rh and














dKh(t) = (Rh(t)1¡¯Kh(t)® ¡ Ch(t))dt;
dS(t) = dJ(t) ¡ nRh(t)dt;
and the boundary conditions










Deﬁne the value function V (S;Kh) for this maximization problem by











where ½ > 0 is a discount factor, g is a given function which represents the evaluation
of existing stocks, 0 < ®;¯ < 1. ¿ is the ﬁrst exit time from D,
¿ = infft > 0;(S(t);Kh(t)) = 2 Dg;= 1 if f¢g = Á;
where D = f(S;K);S > a;K > 0g and a is a positive constant. Here it is assumed
that the whole system collapses when the economy reaches to ¿, and that it is
necessary for the economy to keep minimum sustainable level a of the resource
stock.
It is known (see Kushner and Dupuis [5],e.g.) that this optimization problem is
equivalent to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation;
(2.3)


















for (S;Kh) 2 D, and
V (S;Kh) = g(S;Kh) for (S;Kh) 2 @D;
where VKh = @V=@Kh and VS = @V=@S.










hVKh ¡ nVS = 0










Substituting these conditions into Eq.(2.3), we obtain the partial diﬀerential equa-
tion for V (S;Kh). As Long and Katayama ([6]) have indicated, the solution to the
diﬀerential equation is not simple. Instead of solving it directly we take the same
solution as the one used by them. Assume that the partial diﬀerential equation has
a simple solution






















































½A = ®(1 ¡ ®)¡1=®A1¡1=®
½B = ¯(nB)1¡1=¯[(1 ¡ ®)A]1=¯ + ¸Bd(¯;¾):
Assume that






















From these results, we can obtain the following.




where A and B are deﬁned by the above formulas, then the optimal consumption Ch
and the optimal resource extraction Rh are given by
(2.4)
8
> > > <














respectively. Moreover, the corresponding optimal trajectory of two stocks (Kh;S)
are given by the following diﬀerential equations;
(2.5)
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> > > > > <



















with initial (boundary) conditions Kh(0) = K0 > 0 and S(0) = S0 > a > 0.
The phase diagram for this system in the (Kh;S) plane is almost the same as
Long-Katayama ([6]) or Fujisaki-Ibuki-Katayama ([3]). In fact, it is clear that if the
jumps occur in the negative direction which could happen in such case as sudden
destruction of the resource stock, then both the resource stock S and capital stock
Kh will eventually converges to the boundary (0;a).
Remark 2.1 It is easy to see that the assumption (A.1) is satisﬁed if we choose ½
and ¸ so that d(¯;¾) < ½=¸. The economic meaning is that the average size and the
number of jumps are restricted not to be so large.
Remark 2.2 The optimal consumption rule (2.4) is independent of the stock of the
resource, and as ([6]) shows, the extraction by agent h depends only on the resource
stock per head, S=n. Notice that Long and Katayama ([6]) has derived the optimal
extraction function as Rh = [½=¯] £ [S=n] in the absence of jumps inresource size.
Our result is obtained by replacing ½ with ± = ½ ¡ ¸d(¯;¾). If d(¯;¾) ¸ 0, then
the optimal extraction is revealed to be less under jumps than without them for the
same level of resource stock. Moreover as ± is decreasing in ¸, the optimal extraction
decreases as the resource jumps more frequently. It is the way for economic agents
to react more cautiously to cope with the uncertainty. However, the more cautious
behavior is not applied to consumption, since the optimal level Ch is shown to be the
same as in Long and Katayama ([6]).
63 Exhaustion probability
In this paragraph, we will calculate the exhaustion probability of the stock
process. Using the optimal resource extraction rules (2.4) and optimal trajectories
(2.5), the stock process is given by the following formula;




where J is a pure jump process given by (1.2) and we put ´ = ±=¯. Note that
(3.1) is written in terms of the following stochastic diﬀerential equation, so called
stochastic exponential;
(3.2) dS(t) = S(t¡)dY (t);S(0) = S0







We will need the following assumptions.
(A.2) inff∆Y (t);t > 0g > ¡1 (a:s:);
where ∆Y (t) ´ Y (t) ¡ Y (t¡). Otherwise, S(t) may be negative (see Remark 3.1
(1)). In the following, assume that the support of the measure ¾(z)dz is included in
the interval (¡1;1) (cf. Remark 2.1). Then it is well known (see Applebaum [1])
that the unique solution of Eq.(3.2) is represented as follows;
(3.3)
S(t) = S0eY (t) Q
s·t[1 + ∆Y (s)]e¡∆Y (s)




fz6=0;z>¡1g log(1 + z)N(ds;dz)g:
Note that if S0 > a > 0, then S(t) > 0 for all t > 0.
Put ˜ S(t) = logS(t) then







¿a = infft > 0;S(t) · ag; = 1 if f¢g = Á;
then
¿a = infft > 0; ˜ S(t) · logag:
¿a is the time for the economy to reach break down limit.
3.1 Non-exhautible case
We are going to investigate when the system is not exhautible (i.e. does not
ruin). For ease of computations, suppose that fºi;i < 1g and f·i;i < 1g are
7mutually independent sequences of iid random variables and they are point masses
of the Poisson random measure N(ds;dz). Furthermore we assume that º0 = 0,
the ¿n = ºn+1 ¡ ºn are exponentially distributed with mean 1=¸, and the ·n has
distribution ¾(z)dz. Roughly speaking, the ºn and ·n mean the jump times and
jump sizes of the process respectively (see [5], pp.28»30). Note that (A.2) means
that for any n, ·n > ¡1. Then we have a lemma (c.f. [2],[4],[7]).
Lemma 3.1 Let k > 0, then it follows that
E[e
¡k ˜ S(t)] = expf¡kc + tfk´ ¡ ¸(1 ¡ Φ(k))g;
where
























log(1 + ·n)g ´ I1 £ I2;
where c = logS0 and for each t, N(t) denotes the Poisson random measure with
intensity ¸t, the number of jump times ºn which is less than t.
We will calculate only the expectation part I2. Since both sequences f·ng and
























¡k] £ P(N(t) = l):
Since N(t) is Poisson process with intensity ¸t, it follows that
















8from which the assertion follows immediately. (c.q.f.d.)
Assume that there exists a k¤ > 0 such that
(A.3) k¤´ ¡ ¸(1 ¡ Φ(k¤)) = 0;
then we have the following.
Lemma 3.2 M
¤(t) ´ e
¡k¤ ˜ S(t) is a martingale if and only if (A.3) holds. Moreover,
it can be shown that Ma
t = M¤
t^¿a is also martingale.
Proof We have to show that for any t > s, E[M¤(t)jFs] = M¤(s), where Ft is the
ﬁltration generated by fNtg. But this follows from the fact that M¤(t) is stationary
process with independent increments and (A.3). Since t ^ ¿a is bounded stopping




t ] = E[M
¤
t^¿a] = E[e
¡k¤ ˜ S(t^¿a)] = e
¡k¤c
for all t > 0. Since ˜ S(¿a) · loga on f¿a · tg, we deduce that
P(¿a · t) · e
¡k¤(loga0¡loga)
for all t > 0. Note that c = logS0 = loga0 > loga: An intuitive meaning of (A.3) is
that average number of jumps and the sizes are small (see Remark 3.1(2)). We can
summarize as follows.
Theorem 3.1 Assume (A.3), then
(1) P(¿a < 1) = supt P(¿a · t) · e¡k¤(loga0¡loga) < 1. Therefore, in this case,
the probability that exhaustion does not occur is strictly positive, in other words, the
ruin probability < 1.
(2) P(¿a · t) ! 0 as a0 ! 1
(3) P(¿a · t) ! 0 as a ! 0.
The economic meaning of this proposition is that as far as average number of jumps
and the sizes are small, the ruin probability of the economy within limited time is
less than one. And the probality goes to zero when the initial resource stock is large
or the minimum stock requirement is small.
3.2 Exhaustible case
Next we will study the case when the stock process is exhaustible eventually
with probability 1. Due to (3.3), ˜ S(t) is written as follows:








9For any f 2 C1, due to Ito’s formula,









[f(˜ S(s¡) + log(1 + z)) ¡ f(˜ S(s¡))]N(ds;dz)
Taking the mathematical expectation, we get














Lf(x) = (¡´)@xf(x) + ¸
Z
[f(x + log(1 + x)) ¡ f(x)]¾(x)dx:
Assume that there exists a nondecreasing function f 2 C1 such that
(A.4) Lf(x) · ¡1
for all x ¸ ˜ S0. Then one deduce
E[f(˜ St^¿a) ¡ f(˜ S0)] = E[
Z t^¿a
0
Lf(˜ S(s))ds] · ¡E[t ^ ¿a];
or equivalently,
E[t ^ ¿a] · E[f(˜ S0) ¡ f(˜ St^¿a)]:
Note that the right side is bounded because
sup
0·t<1
E[f(˜ S0) ¡ f(˜ St^¿a) · E[f(˜ S0) ¡ f(loga)];
we have the following.
Theorem 3.2 Assume (A.4), then E[¿a] is bounded. Moreover,
P(¿a ¸ t) · ·=t ! 0
as t ! 1, where · = f(˜ S0) ¡ E[f(˜ S(¿a)]. Therefore, in this case, the exhaustion
occurs with probability 1.
It shoud be noiced that (A.3) and (A.4) are mutually inconsistent. Under the as-
sumption (A.4) the probability for the economy to survive eventually goes to zero.
10Remark 3.1 (1) The assumption (A.2) can be dropped and we can extend to the
case where ∆Y (t) is arbitrary. But in this case S(t) may take negative values so
that it is not good for our case. ([1]).
(2) The assumption (A.3) is equivalent to the following equation with respect to
k > 0,
(3.4) 1 ¡ Φ(k) = k»;
where » = ´=¸ = ±=¯¸. Since Φ(k) ¸ 0, k» · 1. Note also that it is necessary
that Φ(k) · 1 because k» > 0. Since Φ(0) = 1, k = 0 is trivial solution of Eq.(3.4).
Assume that Φ0(0) < 0 and choose » such that ¡Φ0(0) > ». then it is easy to see




log(1 + z)¾(z)dz > 0:
If the jump sizes are always positive, i.e. the density ¾(z) has compact support in
(0;1), then the above inequality is clearly satisﬁed, so that there is a positive so-
lution of Eq.(3.4). However, if there arises negative jumps, then it depends on the
sizes of negative jumps. Some examples are shown later in which there exists solu-
tion k > 0.
(3) Put f(x) = cx where c is a positive constant. Then the assumption (A.4) means
that
(3.6) cf¡´ + ¸
Z
log(1 + z)¾(z)dzg · ¡1:
Suppose that
(3.7) ¡´ + ¸
Z
log(1 + z)¾(z)dz < 0;
then we can choose c > 0 so that (3.6) holds. It is obvious that this is valid if only
negative jumps occur. Note also that (3.7) implies that E[˜ S(t)] · loga0 for all t and
also E[˜ S(t ^ ¿a)] · loga0. Moreover, if
Z
log(1 + z)¾(z)dz < 0;
then (A.4) is clearly satisﬁed (cf.(3.5)). For example, put ¾(z) be uniformly dis-






0 z < ¡1=2
2z + 1 ¡1=2 · z < 0
e¡(4=3)z 0 · z
It is easily seen that Φ(0) = 1;Φ(k) is strictly decreasing for 0 < k · 2 and then it
is increasing for 2 < k and limk!1 Φ(k) = 1. Therefore, if we choose » so small






0 z < ¡1=2
2z + 1 ¡1=2 · z < 0
¡(2=3)z + 1 0 · z < 3=2
0 3=2 · z
If we choose » so small that » < ¡Φ0(0) ¼ 0:2356, then there exists a solution k¤ > 0
of Eq.(3.4).
4 Non-cooperative outcome
In this section we turn to the non-cooperative scenario following [6]. Assume










dS(t) = ¡(Ri + r(n ¡ 1)S)dt + dJ(t);
where r is a positive constant, J(t) is given by (1.2) and the boundary conditions
are the same as the cooperative case in x2. Moreover, suppose that each agent i’s
value function is given by the following.











where ¿i is the ﬁrst exit time from D,
¿i = infft > 0;(S(t);Ki(t)) = 2 Dg;
D = f(S;K);S > a;K > 0g and a is a positive constant. By using the same method
as [6] and x2, we have the following result. Suppose that ¯ and the number of agents
n satisﬁes that
(A.5) 1 ¡ n(1 ¡ ¯) > 0 or equivalently, n < 1=(1 ¡ ¯).
Proposition 4.1 Assume (A.5) and that g in (4.2) is given of the form
g(S;Ki) = ˆ AK
1¡®
i + ˆ BS
1¡¯;












> > > <







1 ¡ n(1 ¡ ¯)
£ S;
respectively. Moreover, the corresponding optimal trajectory of two stocks (Ki;S)
are given by the following diﬀerential equations;
(4.4)
8
> > > > > <














dS(t) = dJ(t) ¡
½
n±
1 ¡ n(1 ¡ ¯)
¾
Sdt
with initial (boundary) conditions Ki(0) = K0 > 0 and S(0) = S0 > a > 0.
If 1 < n < 1=(1 ¡ ¯) then the extraction rate in the cooperative scenario is less
than the non-cooperative one. It is also shown that each agent’s welfare under the
non-cooperative scenario is worse than the cooperatve one.
Next we are interesting to calculate the ruin probability under the non-cooperative
scenario. Let ´0 = n±=f1 ¡ n(1 ¡ ¯)g, then ´ < ´0 if 1 < n < 1=(1 ¡ ¯), where
´ = ±=¯. Then optimal stock process S0(t) is written as follows;
(4.5) S



















Put ˜ S0(t) = logS0(t) and ¿0
a = infft > 0;S0(t) · ag; then ¿0
a = infft > 0; ˜ S0(t) ·
logag. Since ´ < ´0, logS0(t) · logS(t) or equivalently, S0(t) · S(t). This implies
that ¿0
a · ¿a so that P(¿a < 1) · P(¿0
a < 1). More precisely, by using similar
arguments as in x3, we can obtain the following.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that there exists a k0¤ such that
(A.6) k0¤´0 ¡ ¸(1 ¡ Φ(k0¤)) = 0;
then the assertion of Theorem 3.1 still holds for ¿0
a and k0¤.
As for the probability P(¿0
a > t), we can proceed the same way as x3.
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